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[Excerpt] After two decades of massive employment losses in heavily unionized sectors of the economy 
and exponential growth of the largely unorganized service sector, the U.S. labor movement is struggling to 
remain relevant. Despite new organizing initiatives and practices, union organizing today remains a 
tremendously arduous endeavor, particularly in the private sector, as workers and their unions are 
routinely confronted with an arsenal of aggressive legal and illegal antiunion employer tactics. This 
vigorous opposition to unions in the private sector does not stop once an election is won, but continues 
throughout bargaining for an initial union agreement, all too often turning organizing victories into 
devastating first-contract defeats. 
Despite these overwhelming obstacles, workers still organize and win—through certification elections and 
voluntary recognition campaigns in both the private and public sectors. And each year unions 
successfully negotiate thousands of first contracts in the United States, providing union representation 
for the first time to hundreds of thousands of new workers. This research takes an in-depth look at what 
unions achieve in these initial union contracts. Why, when confronted with such powerful opposition, do 
unorganized workers continue to want to belong to unions and newly organized workers want to stay 
union? What do these first contracts provide that makes the struggle worthwhile? 
To explore these questions, we analyze and evaluate union first contracts along four primary dimensions. 
First, we inventory the basic workers’ rights provided by these contracts, which go beyond the very limited 
rights provided by federal and state labor law under the “employment at will” system. Second, we evaluate 
how first contracts provide workers and their unions with the institutional power to shape work and the 
labor process on a day-to-day basis. Third, we explore how first contracts codify the presence and power 
of unions in daily work life, and we evaluate which institutional arrangements provide a meaningful role 
for workers and their unions in their workplaces. Fourth, we examine the kinds of workplace benefits that 
are codified and supplemented in first contracts, gaining important insights into the types of human 
resource practices that exist in newly unionized workplaces. Finally, by examining the interactions among 
these four dimensions, we explore the limitations of what first contracts have been able to achieve in the 
current organizing environment, and what it would take for unions to improve the quality of first contracts. 
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Significant Victories 
An Analysis of Union First Contracts 
Tom Juravich 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst 
Kate Bronfenbrenner 
Cornell University 
Robert Hickey 
Queen’s University 
After two decades of massive employment losses in heavily union-
ized sectors of the economy and exponential growth of the largely unor-
ganized service sector, the U.S. labor movement is struggling to remain 
relevant. Despite new organizing initiatives and practices, union orga-
nizing today remains a tremendously arduous endeavor, particularly in 
the private sector, as workers and their unions are routinely confronted 
with an arsenal of aggressive legal and illegal antiunion employer tac-
tics. This vigorous opposition to unions in the private sector does not 
stop once an election is won, but continues throughout bargaining for 
an initial union agreement, all too often turning organizing victories 
into devastating first-contract defeats (Bronfenbrenner 1997b, 2001). 
Despite these overwhelming obstacles, workers still organize and 
win—through certification elections and voluntary recognition cam-
paigns in both the private and public sectors. And each year unions suc-
cessfully negotiate thousands of first contracts in the United States, pro-
viding union representation for the first time to hundreds of thousands 
of new workers. This research takes an in-depth look at what unions 
achieve in these initial union contracts. Why, when confronted with such 
powerful opposition, do unorganized workers continue to want to be-
long to unions and newly organized workers want to stay union? What 
do these first contracts provide that makes the struggle worthwhile? 
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To explore these questions, we analyze and evaluate union first 
contracts along four primary dimensions. First, we inventory the basic 
workers’ rights provided by these contracts, which go beyond the very 
limited rights provided by federal and state labor law under the “em-
ployment at will” system. Second, we evaluate how first contracts pro-
vide workers and their unions with the institutional power to shape work 
and the labor process on a day-to-day basis. Third, we explore how first 
contracts codify the presence and power of unions in daily work life, 
and we evaluate which institutional arrangements provide a meaningful 
role for workers and their unions in their workplaces. Fourth, we exam-
ine the kinds of workplace benefits that are codified and supplemented 
in first contracts, gaining important insights into the types of human 
resource practices that exist in newly unionized workplaces. Finally, by 
examining the interactions among these four dimensions, we explore 
the limitations of what first contracts have been able to achieve in the 
current organizing environment, and what it would take for unions to 
improve the quality of first contracts. 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON FIRST CONTRACTS 
There is a growing body of literature on organizing in both the pri-
vate and public sectors (Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998; Milkman and Voss 
2004). However, only a small portion of this research extends to first-
contract campaigns (Bronfenbrenner 1996, 2001; Hickey 2002; Hurd 
1996). Collective bargaining agreements are regularly evaluated for 
patterns, outcomes, and emerging basic language, yet this work rare-
ly distinguishes between first and subsequent agreements (Bureau of 
National Affairs 1995; Kumar 1989). A series of studies evaluates the 
financial impact of unionization and first contracts on employers (Di-
Nardo and Lee 2004; Freeman 1981). 
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) regularly gathers data 
on the wage differential between the union and nonunion sectors of 
the economy (BLS 2003a,b). But, here too, little effort has been made 
to look specifically at the impact of union first contracts. Furthermore, 
it is inadequate to focus only on the financial rewards of unionization. 
Nonfinancial issues such as dignity, fairness, and workplace control are 
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often the key issues in organizing campaigns and remain central in the 
development of initial union contracts (Bronfenbrenner 1996; Bronfen-
brenner and Hickey 2004). Comparing firms where organizing did or 
did not take place, Freeman and Kleiner (1990, S8) found only moder-
ate wage gains through unionization but suggest that “newly organized 
workers made significant gains in the areas of grievance procedures, job 
posting and bidding, and seniority protection.” To date, however, there 
is no detailed quantitative assessment of these nonfinancial yet crucially 
important aspects of first agreements. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
This research is based on a content analysis of 175 union first con-
tracts in both the public and private sectors. The contracts were as-
sembled as part of Bronfenbrenner’s previous research on private sec-
tor first-contract campaigns (1997a) and on research on public sector 
first-contract campaigns by Bronfenbrenner and Juravich (1995) and 
Juravich and Bronfenbrenner (1998).1 We recognize that these contracts 
from 1987 through 1996 are less than current, but they draw from the 
only existing national random samples of first contract campaigns in 
both the public and private sectors. A review of first contracts collected 
as part of Bronfenbrenner’s most recent first-contract study (2001) sug-
gests no major changes in the nature and extent of first contracts in the 
last decade. 
Because of the lack of prior research on first-contract content, we 
were forced to develop an entirely new research typology to evaluate 
the multiple dimensions of first-contract gains.2 For all 175 first con-
tracts, we evaluated each contract along 296 parameters, measuring the 
extent and nature of various contract provisions.3 Unfortunately, due 
to the absence of previous research in this area, there are no analogous 
earlier data to which our findings can be compared. Thus, our hope is 
that this research typology will provide a baseline upon which future 
union contracts can be compared and will encourage further research 
in this area. 
Table 5.1 provides baseline information on our sample. The first 
contracts are almost equally divided between the private and public 
Table 5.1 Characteristics of the Sample 
Number of contracts 
Average contract duration (in months) 
Signatories 
Local 
Region/district 
International 
Unit scope 
All employees 
Regular full-time employees only 
Regular full-time and all part-time 
employees 
Regular full-time plus some 
Part-time, per-diem, and/or 
part-time 
temporary 
Number of workers covered under contracts 
Unit type 
Blue collar 
White collar 
Professional/technical 
Professional/technical 
Service and maintenance 
All contracts 
Number 
175 
— 
144 
4 
3 
25 
19 
63 
35 
5 
27,651 
45 
10 
21 
21 
54 
Mean or 
proportion 
1.00 
28.50 
0.82 
0.02 
0.02 
0.14 
0.11 
0.36 
0.20 
0.03 
159 
0.26 
0.06 
0.12 
0.12 
0.31 
Private sector 
Number 
94 
— 
82 
2 
2 
11 
15 
37 
22 
1 
11,453 
37 
4 
7 
7 
19 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.54 
30.30 
0.87 
0.02 
0.02 
0.12 
0.16 
0.39 
0.23 
0.01 
123 
0.39 
0.04 
0.07 
0.07 
0.20 
Public sector 
Number 
81 
— 
62 
2 
1 
14 
4 
26 
13 
4 
16,198 
8 
6 
14 
14 
35 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.46 
26.30 
0.78 
0.03 
0.01 
0.17 
0.05 
0.32 
0.16 
0.05 
200 
0.10 
0.07 
0.17 
0.17 
0.43 
Wall-to-wall 
Other 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
Communications and utilities 
Construction 
Retail 
Transportation 
Health care (both public and private) 
Social, business and other services 
City/county government 
Public education (including higher 
education) 
Bargaining unit demographics 
At least 50% workers of color 
No workers of color in the unit 
Proportion of workers of color in the unit 
At least 50% women workers 
No female workers 
Proportion female workers in unit 
At least 25% part-time workers 
No part-time workers 
26 
18 
32 
5 
2 
5 
6 
31 
13 
36 
43 
57 
37 
— 
104 
10 
— 
42 
91 
0.15 
0.10 
0.19 
0.03 
0.01 
0.03 
0.04 
0.18 
0.08 
0.21 
0.25 
0.33 
0.21 
0.31 
0.59 
0.06 
0.52 
0.24 
0.52 
15 
11 
32 
5 
2 
5 
6 
29 
13 
0 
0 
44 
12 
— 
38 
10 
— 
18 
49 
0.16 
0.12 
0.34 
0.05 
0.02 
0.05 
0.06 
0.31 
0.14 
— 
— 
0.47 
0.13 
0.43 
0.40 
0.11 
0.38 
0.19 
0.52 
11 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
36 
43 
13 
25 
— 
66 
0 
— 
24 
35 
0.14 
0.09 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
0.03 
— 
0.44 
0.53 
0.16 
0.31 
0.18 
0.82 
— 
0.67 
0.30 
0.43 
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sectors. The vast majority (82 percent) of the contracts were negoti-
ated on a local level, with an average duration of slightly more than 
two years. In the private sector the major industries represented include 
manufacturing (34 percent) and health care (31 percent). Blue-collar 
units represent the largest proportion (39 percent) of the private sec-
tor contracts, followed by service and maintenance units, wall-to-wall 
units, and professional/technical and white-collar units. In the public 
sector the contracts are concentrated in service and maintenance units 
(43 percent) and professional/technical units (17 percent), primarily in 
education (53 percent) and municipalities (44 percent). 
A majority of the workers covered under these agreements are 
women. This is especially true in the public sector, where women aver-
age 67 percent of the unit compared to 38 percent in the private sector. 
Workers of color are more concentrated in private sector units, where 
they represent the majority in almost half the units. 
BEYOND EMPLOYMENT AT WILL 
Table 5.2 summarizes the basic workplace rights provided for in first 
contracts. Most of these protections are already “guaranteed” by federal 
and state legislation. Yet, contractual antidiscrimination language is im-
portant for two reasons. First, it demonstrates to the employer, union 
members, and the broader community that the union is concerned about 
these issues. But equally important, it provides an enforcement mecha-
nism that involves significantly less effort, cost, and time than claims 
filed under state or federal law. 
As we can see from Table 5.2, nearly three-quarters of the contracts 
in our sample contained a discrimination clause, with about two-thirds 
covering a range of types of discrimination including race, gender, na-
tional origin, religion, age, and disability. Of the units with at least 25 
percent women, 63 percent had gender discrimination language, while 
73 percent of the units with at least 25 percent workers of color had 
language covering race discrimination. Fewer than 25 percent of the 
contracts cover other types of discrimination, such as sexual orienta-
tion, political affiliation, and veteran status. Only 6 percent had sepa-
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rate sexual harassment language, and 1 percent had separate pay equity 
language. 
For nearly all the most common antidiscrimination protections, the 
percentage of public sector contracts including these protections was 
10–20 percent lower than the private sector contracts. This may result 
from the fact that many public sector workers may be covered by state 
and local discrimination laws that provide them a more streamlined 
process for filing antidiscrimination suits than federal protections. 
Seventeen percent of the first contracts go beyond basic workplace 
rights to include specific contract language that requires management 
to treat employees with respect and dignity. Respect and dignity is-
sues are often core elements of successful organizing campaigns, and 
these clauses provide an opportunity for the union to file grievances and 
publicly question management’s reputation, even when other contract 
clauses have not been violated. 
As is clear in Table 5.2, in a significant departure from the nonunion 
employment-at-will environment, nearly three-quarters of the contracts 
we examined require discipline and discharge to be based on just cause, 
thus constraining management’s ability to play favorites or to intimidate 
and threaten workers who challenge them. Nearly 40 percent of first 
contracts also codify Weingarten rights for union members to obtain 
union representation when they believe that they will be disciplined, 
and 13 percent expand on those rights by requiring the employer to no-
tify the employee of his or her right to union representation before the 
disciplinary meeting begins. 
Virtually all the contracts in our sample (96 percent) create a griev-
ance procedure with third-party arbitration. Employers, who before the 
first contract was settled retained sole authority to make decisions in 
the workplace, become bound by a system that allows for independent 
third-party review of disputes between management and employees. 
This due process language is the most widespread provision in this 
study, and provides the enforcement mechanism that guarantees all the 
other clauses in the first agreement. A quarter of the contracts permit 
class-action grievances where the remedies apply to all those affected 
by the violation. 
Table 5.2 Workplace Rights Provided by First Contracts 
Antidiscrimination protections 
Union activity 
Racea 
Genderb 
Age 
Disability 
National origin 
Family status 
Marital status 
Sexual orientation 
Political affiliation 
Religion 
Veteran status 
Separate sexual harassment clause 
Pay equity 
Compliance with all state, local, and federal 
laws 
Respect and dignity clause 
Discipline and discharge 
All contracts 
Number 
128 
101 
123 
122 
112 
92 
118 
8 
48 
31 
38 
115 
26 
10 
2 
9 
29 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.730 
0.58 
0.70 (0.73) 
0.70 (0.63) 
0.64 
0.53 
0.67 
0.05 
0.27 
0.18 
0.22 
0.66 
0.15 
0.06 
0.01 
0.05 
0.17 
Private sector 
Number 
80 
51 
75 
74 
66 
52 
72 
2 
17 
19 
14 
68 
20 
5 
1 
9 
25 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.85 
0.54 
0.80 (0.78) 
0.79 (0.74) 
0.70 
0.55 
0.77 
0.02 
0.18 
0.20 
0.15 
0.72 
0.21 
0.05 
0.01 
0.10 
0.27 
Public sector 
Number 
48 
50 
48 
48 
46 
40 
46 
6 
31 
12 
24 
47 
6 
5 
1 
0 
4 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.59 
0.62 
0.59 (0.62) 
0.59 (0.54) 
0.57 
0.49 
0.57 
0.07 
0.38 
0.15 
0.30 
0.58 
0.07 
0.06 
0.01 
— 
0.05 
Just cause 122 0.70 67 0.71 55 0.68 
Specified progressive discipline procedure 
Grievable Weingarten rights (notification) 
Grievable Weingarten rights (no 
notification) 
Grievance procedure 
Grievance procedure with 3rd party 
arbitration 
Expedited grievance procedures 
Class-action grievances permitted 
48 
22 
42 
168 
50 
47 
0.27 
0.13 
0.24 
0.96 
0.29 
0.27 
19 
14 
16 
93 
25 
11 
0.20 
0.15 
0.17 
0.99 
0.27 
0.12 
29 
8 
26 
75 
25 
36 
0.36 
0.10 
0.32 
0.93 
0.31 
0.44 
aNumbers in parentheses report the proportion of units with 25% or more workers of color that have no race discrimination language. 
bNumbers in parentheses report the proportions of units with 25% or more female workers that have gender discrimination language. 
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UNION RESTRICTIONS ON MANAGEMENT RIGHTS 
In addition to these basic rights, first contracts contain language 
outlining a system of rational and equitable rules and procedures for 
workplace practices, restraining unilateral decisions by management. 
As we can see in Table 5.3, seniority plays a key role in developing con-
sistent, nonarbitrary procedures for promotions, layoffs, recall, trans-
fers, and vacation and overtime scheduling. However, seniority is less 
of a feature in public than in private sector agreements because in many 
cases it is already codified in civil service law. 
It is important to note that none of the seniority clauses in the first 
contracts in our sample include affirmative action language to protect 
women and workers of color from being “last hired, first fired.” This is 
a relevant issue for the labor movement, particularly since women and 
workers of color continue to make up the majority of new workers or-
ganized. This lack of language on affirmative action may not just be the 
result of bargaining. Over the past decade we have seen an increasing 
number of legal challenges to affirmative action, which has made many 
public entities hesitant to sign on to these types of provisions. 
The first contracts we examined also contain language laying out 
the process for promotions and the filling of vacancies beyond basic 
seniority rights. More than three-quarters of agreements in both sec-
tors provide for the posting of vacancies. In 40 percent of the contracts 
internal candidates are given priority in hiring. More than one-third of 
the contracts provide for provisional transfer to newly posted positions. 
However, very few contracts provide opportunities for part-time em-
ployees to bid on full-time work. 
Thirty-eight percent of the contracts go beyond state and federal 
wage and hour laws to require overtime pay after 8 hours and 6 percent 
provide overtime for work beyond an employee’s regularly scheduled 
hours. This is particularly important for part-time workers, who other-
wise are frequently asked to work additional hours but not enough to 
reach the legislated threshold of 40 hours a week. 
While expanded hours and mandatory overtime are an increasing 
problem in today’s workplaces, virtually none of the contracts set limits 
on mandatory overtime. These provisions mirror contract negotiations 
in general, where even after long strikes few unions have succeeded 
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in eliminating 12-hour days or cutting back on mandatory overtime 
(Franklin 2001). 
A number of contracts in our sample, particularly those in the pri-
vate sector, where weekend and evening shifts are more common, have 
clauses that codify and/or expand upon shift differentials (supplemental 
pay) for those employees who work outside of the regular workday or 
workweek. Nearly one-half of private sector first contracts guarantee a 
shift differential for evening work, while a smaller percentage establish 
differentials for weekend work. 
One-third of private sector contracts and 51 percent of public sec-
tor contracts have language outlining work schedules and hours. Many 
contracts also require the posting of schedules and notice of, or protec-
tion from, changes outside workers’ regularly scheduled hours. These 
clauses are important because they provide workers predictability and 
control over their work schedules. Workload and minimum staffing, 
serious issues in almost every workplace, are addressed in only 7 per-
cent of first agreements. This reflects the fact that most employers ag-
gressively oppose any inclusion of staff and workload protections in 
the contract and frequently argue that these are absolute management 
rights. 
Health and safety is another area that dramatically distinguishes 
union from nonunion workplaces. Forty-two percent of all contracts 
and 55 percent of private sector contracts have grievable health and 
safety clauses. Thirty-one percent include language requiring employ-
ers to provide protective equipment, and 30 percent establish a joint 
health and safety committee. Only a small number (6 percent) give 
workers the right to refuse unsafe work, and only 5 percent guarantee 
workers and unions the right to health and safety information. 
Unions have not been very successful in gaining significant job se-
curity protections in first contracts, despite the increasing importance 
of such language in a climate of corporate restructuring, technological 
change, privatization, and capital mobility. As described in Table 5.3, 
approximately one-third of private sector first agreements include some 
language governing restrictions on successorship, restricting the use of 
temporary workers, subcontracting, and supervisors doing bargaining-
unit work. Much less common are provisions relating to new owners 
honoring the agreement, union notification of closure, and technologi-
cal change. 
Table 5.3 Union Restrictions on Management Rights 
Seniority 
Overtime 
Layoff 
Recall 
Transfer 
Promotions where minimum qualifications are met 
Promotions where equally qualified 
Shift assignments 
Holidays 
Vacation 
Prorated for part-time employeesa 
Full seniority for part-time employeesa 
Layoffs or reduction of hours 
Long-term layoff notice 
Average minimum number of days notice 
Short-term layoff without seniority consideration 
Bumping rights 
Severance pay 
Retraining 
Recall rights 
All contracts 
Number 
36 
132 
116 
48 
16 
72 
10 
3 
63 
18 
7 
74 
— 
9 
81 
7 
4 
142 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.21 
0.75 
0.66 
0.27 
0.09 
0.41 
0.06 
0.02 
0.36 
0.10 (0.07) 
0.04 (0.05) 
0.42 
17 
0.05 
0.46 
0.04 
0.02 
0.81 
Private sector 
Number 
27 
79 
70 
35 
10 
51 
6 
3 
46 
7 
4 
41 
— 
8 
46 
6 
4 
82 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.29 
0.84 
0.75 
0.37 
0.11 
0.54 
0.06 
0.03 
0.49 
0.07 (0.11) 
0.04 (0.06) 
0.44 
9.9 
0.09 
0.49 
0.06 
0.04 
0.87 
Public sector 
Number 
9 
53 
46 
13 
6 
21 
4 
0 
17 
11 
3 
33 
— 
1 
35 
1 
0 
60 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.11 
0.65 
0.37 
0.16 
0.07 
0.26 
0.05 
— 
0.21 
0.14 (0.04) 
0.04 (0.04) 
0.41 
23.7 
0.01 
0.43 
0.01 
— 
0.74 
Promotions and filling of vacancies 
Posting of vacancies 
Internal candidates first priority 
Opportunity of temporary trial/return 
Part-timers can bid for full-timea 
Overtime 
Overtime for over regularly scheduled hours 
Overtime pay for over 40 hours per week 
Overtime pay for over 8 hours 
Overtime equalization 
No mandatory overtime 
Limits on mandatory overtime 
Premium pay for over 12 hours work 
Premium pay for over 6 days a week 
Shift and other pay differentials 
Evening differential 
Saturday differential 
Sunday differential 
Relief in higher classification 
Schedules, hours of work, and minimum 
staffing/workload 
Hours and scheduling specified in the contract 
Posting of schedules required 
Minimum staffing/workload 
140 
70 
65 
7 
10 
24 
67 
32 
3 
9 
6 
4 
60 
24 
35 
63 
72 
39 
13 
0.80 
0.40 
0.37 
0.04 (0.10) 
0.06 
0.19 
0.38 
0.18 
0.02 
0.05 
0.03 
0.02 
0.34 
0.14 
0.20 
0.36 
0.41 
0.22 
0.07 
75 
40 
42 
5 
6 
22 
43 
21 
0 
8 
6 
3 
46 
15 
25 
33 
31 
29 
8 
0.80 
0.43 
0.45 
0.05 (0.11) 
0.06 
0.23 
0.46 
0.22 
— 
0.09 
0.06 
0.03 
0.49 
0.16 
0.27 
0.35 
0.33 
0.31 
0.09 
65 
30 
23 
2 
4 
2 
24 
11 
3 
1 
0 
1 
14 
9 
10 
30 
41 
10 
5 
0.80 
0.37 
0.28 
0.03 (0.08) 
0.05 
0.03 
0.30 
0.14 
0.04 
0.01 
— 
0.01 
0.17 
0.11 
0.12 
0.37 
0.51 
0.12 
0.06 
Table 5.3 (continued) 
Health and safety 
Right to refuse unsafe work 
Employer provided protective 
equipment 
Health and safety committee 
Right to information 
Grievable health and safety language 
Employees will alert employer of 
safety concerns 
Job security and protecting bargaining 
unit work 
Subcontracting rules 
Restrictions on the use of temporary 
workers 
Restrictions on supervisors doing 
bargaining unit work 
Successorship language 
Purchaser must honor contract 
Union notified, request purchaser to 
honor agreement 
New technology language 
All contracts 
Number 
10 
54 
52 
8 
73 
7 
40 
28 
41 
35 
11 
6 
8 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.06 
0.31 
0.30 
0.05 
0.42 
0.04 
0.23 
0.16 
0.23 
0.20 
0.06 
0.03 
0.05 
All contracts 
Number 
7 
33 
36 
7 
52 
5 
21 
25 
33 
30 
7 
6 
8 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.07 
0.35 
0.38 
0.07 
0.55 
0.05 
0.22 
0.27 
0.35 
0.32 
0.07 
0.06 
0.09 
All contracts 
Number 
3 
21 
16 
1 
21 
2 
19 
3 
8 
5 
4 
0 
0 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.04 
0.26 
0.20 
0.01 
0.26 
0.03 
0.24 
0.04 
0.10 
0.06 
0.05 
— 
— 
aNumbers in parentheses report the proportion of units with at least 25% part-time workers. 
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UNION RIGHTS AND PRACTICES UNDER 
FIRST CONTRACTS 
Table 5.4 presents data on how union rights and practices become 
codified and institutionalized after the signing of an initial union agree-
ment. First contracts lay out the parameters by which unions operate 
on a day-to-day basis. Nearly two-thirds of all the first contracts in our 
sample have an agency or union shop, thereby laying a foundation upon 
which the union can more easily establish and maintain its presence 
in the workplace. For those with open shops, 91 percent of the private 
sector contracts and 69 percent of the public sector contracts were in 
right-to-work states, where open shops are required. Union security is 
further strengthened in the three quarters of the first contracts that allow 
for dues check-off—where union dues and/or agency fees are automati-
cally deducted from workers’ paychecks. 
Another essential element of union representation is language guar-
anteeing staff and officers access to the workplace and to bargaining-
unit members. Forty-five percent of private sector first contracts and 25 
percent of public sector first contracts have liberal union access policies 
allowing union representatives to meet with employees in the work-
place without having prior authorization from the employer or being 
restricted to certain times and certain areas. This is less of an issue in 
the public sector, however, because a combination of open meeting and 
public access laws provides union representatives, as members of the 
public, equal access to any public areas or public meetings. 
Nearly one-half of first contracts provide stewards release time to 
investigate grievances, although this is more prevalent in the private 
sector than in the public sector. Approximately one-third grant stew-
ards paid release time to investigate grievances on company time. Fifty-
eight percent of first contracts grant stewards release time for grievance 
processing, and almost half allow this to take place on paid company 
time. Less than 10 percent of the contracts in both sectors have contract 
language allowing for new member orientation, despite the importance 
of such language in recently organized units, where everyone is new to 
the union. 
More than one-third of the contracts provide union leave for of-
ficers and 25 percent provide union leave for members to attend union 
Table 5.4 Union Practice after First Contracts 
Type of shop 
Union 
Agency 
Open 
Proportion of open shops in right-to-work states 
Dues check-off 
Union staff access to workplace 
Liberal 
Restricted 
No access specified in contract 
Union access 
Union bulletin board for union postings 
Union right to information 
Officer/steward rights 
Stewards’ time to investigate grievances 
Paid release time to investigate grievances 
Stewards’ time to process grievances 
Paid release time to process grievances 
Paid release time for other meetings with management 
Union orientation 
Union leave for officers to conduct union business 
All contracts 
Number 
61 
51 
34 
28 
128 
62 
50 
63 
142 
17 
78 
56 
102 
83 
44 
14 
15 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.35 
0.29 
0.19 
0.82 
0.73 
0.35 
0.29 
0.36 
0.81 
0.10 
0.45 
0.32 
0.58 
0.47 
0.25 
0.08 
0.09 
Private sector 
Number 
57 
12 
21 
19 
67 
42 
33 
19 
82 
12 
53 
32 
62 
44 
13 
7 
6 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.61 
0.13 
0.22 
0.91 
0.71 
0.45 
0.35 
0.20 
0.87 
0.13 
0.56 
0.34 
0.66 
0.47 
0.14 
0.07 
0.06 
Public sector 
Number 
4 
39 
13 
9 
61 
20 
17 
44 
60 
5 
25 
24 
40 
39 
31 
7 
9 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.05 
0.48 
0.16 
0.69 
0.75 
0.25 
0.21 
0.54 
0.74 
0.06 
0.31 
0.30 
0.49 
0.48 
0.38 
0.09 
0.11 
Union leave for officers to attend meetings conventions 
Paid union leave to attend meetings/conventions 
Unpaid leave for officers to take higher union office 
Paid leave for members to process grievances 
Union leave for members to attend meetings/conventions 
Paid leave to attend meetings/conventions 
64 
29 
33 
11 
43 
18 
0.37 
0.17 
0.19 
0.06 
0.25 
0.10 
28 
5 
22 
10 
21 
3 
0.30 
0.05 
0.23 
0.11 
0.22 
0.03 
36 
24 
11 
1 
22 
15 
0.42 
0.30 
0.14 
0.01 
0.27 
0.19 
104 Juravich, Bronfenbrenner, and Hickey 
meetings and conventions. Only a few of the contracts in our sample (9 
percent) provide union leave for officers to conduct union business out-
side the workplace, while 19 percent provide for union leaders to take 
union-funded positions, protecting their right to return to the bargaining 
unit. 
BENEFITS IN NEWLY ORGANIZED WORKPLACES 
Table 5.5 summarizes the workplace benefits provided by the first 
contracts in our sample. Health insurance, pension plans, leaves of ab-
sence, pay systems, training, and continuing education are fundamen-
tal concerns for unorganized workers, and are areas that have shown 
a substantial differential between union and nonunion workplaces. 
For example, according to BLS data, 72 percent of unionized work-
ers are covered by defined benefit pension funds compared to only 15 
percent of nonunion workers, while 60 percent of unionized workers 
have medical care benefits compared to 44 percent of nonunion workers 
(BLS 2003a,b). Beyond ensuring basic rights, fair and equitable stan-
dards, and an institutional presence already discussed, these workplace 
benefits help to create and protect a certain quality of life for workers 
and their families. The extent and nature of these contract clauses also 
inform us about the kinds of human resources practices in operation 
in newly organized workplaces, some of which existed before the or-
ganizing campaign but then were codified and guaranteed in the first 
agreement. 
Overall, 89 percent of the first contracts provide contractual guar-
antees for some form of health insurance. Yet, reflecting the spiraling 
costs of health care that had begun to escalate during the period these 
contracts were negotiated, only 10 percent provide fully paid health 
insurance for workers and dependents. This is a significant departure 
from union contracts a generation ago, when many newly organized 
workers were brought into master agreements, which provided fully 
paid family health insurance and union health and welfare plans. 
Pension plans are provided for in only 39 percent of first agree-
ments, with employer-sponsored saving plans offered in an additional 
12 percent and retiree health benefits offered in only 8 percent. Here, 
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too, we see a significant departure from the kinds of retirement benefits 
that once were a common element of large industrial and public sector 
agreements reflecting, in part, the growing efforts by U.S. employers to 
cut costs and long-term liabilities by shifting to a more contingent and 
less costly workforce. 
Nearly three-quarters of the first contracts provide for some sick 
leave benefits. Sick leave benefits are much more prevalent in the pub-
lic sector than in the private sector, but are more likely to be prorated 
for part-time workers in private sector units with significant numbers 
of part-time workers. In approximately one-third of the contracts, sick 
leave may be taken for sick children and other sick dependents. 
Unlike sick leave, vacation and holiday benefits are slightly less 
common in the public sector, partly because most public sector holidays 
are set by law and, for public school employees, vacations are often 
taken outside of the nine-month employment period. Seventy-two per-
cent of private sector contracts provide at least five paid holidays and 83 
percent provide at least one week of vacation, while only 42 percent of 
public sector contracts provide a minimum of five paid holidays and 62 
percent provide at least one week’s vacation. A variety of other leaves 
are provided for in first contracts as well, with the majority of contracts 
including leaves for jury duty, bereavement, military service, and per-
sonal days. 
Table 5.5 also presents data on the kinds of pay systems established 
by first contracts. Almost two-thirds of agreements provide for step sys-
tems. Given the arbitrariness of most nonunion pay systems that fre-
quently involve wages being negotiated on a person-by-person basis, 
step systems are a significant accomplishment. In contrast, only 2 per-
cent of the contracts had merit pay systems, which are the systems that 
dominate the nonunion environment. At the same time, cost-of-living 
adjustments are provided in only 2 percent of first contracts. 
Training benefits are limited, with only one-quarter of agreements 
specifying job training or in-service training provided for by the em-
ployer. Finally, employee involvement clauses were included in 28 per-
cent of the first contracts we examined. However, most of these clauses 
lack union protections. Particularly with the growing management in-
terest in joint programs, unions clearly need bargaining language that 
ensures that these programs are indeed joint and do not undermine the 
union or the contract. 
Table 5.5 Benefits in Newly Organized Workplaces 
Health and other insurance 
Health insurance 
Full individual only 
Full individual plus full family 
Full individual and part family 
Dental insurance 
Short-term disability 
Long-term disability 
Employer contribute to union health and 
welfare plan 
Life insurance 
Vision insurance 
Drug insurance 
Workers compensation provision 
Retirement benefits 
Pension plan 
Employer-sponsored savings plan 
Retirement health plan 
Leaves of absence 
Sick leave 
At least 10 sick days a year 
All contracts 
Number 
156 
12 
17 
24 
90 
38 
31 
11 
106 
18 
22 
55 
68 
21 
14 
122 
72 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.89 
0.07 
0.10 
0.14 
0.51 
0.22 
0.18 
0.06 
0.61 
0.10 
0.13 
0.31 
0.39 
0.12 
0.08 
0.70 
0.41 
Private sector 
Number 
85 
8 
4 
14 
45 
27 
14 
8 
59 
6 
8 
24 
36 
20 
5 
50 
14 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.90 
0.09 
0.04 
0.15 
0.48 
0.29 
0.15 
0.09 
0.63 
0.06 
0.09 
0.26 
0.38 
0.21 
0.05 
0.53 
0.15 
Public sector 
Number 
71 
4 
13 
10 
45 
11 
17 
3 
47 
12 
14 
31 
32 
1 
9 
72 
58 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.88 
0.05 
0.16 
0.12 
0.56 
0.14 
0.21 
0.04 
0.58 
0.15 
0.17 
0.38 
0.40 
0.01 
0.11 
0.89 
0.72 
Average number of days veteran 
Prorated for part-time workersa 
Apply to sick children 
Apply to other sick dependents 
Sick bank 
Vacation 
employees 
At least one week vacation shutdown a year 
Average number of days new employees 
Average number of days veteran 
Prorated for part-time workersa 
employees 
Mandatory vacation for plant shutdown 
Holidays 
At least five holidays a year 
Average number of days new employees 
Average number of days veteran 
Prorated for part-time workersa 
Premium pay 
Parental leave 
Bereavement leave 
Education leave 
Medical/disability leave 
Personal leave of absence 
Military leave 
Jury leave 
employees 
— 
43 
63 
57 
84 
132 
128 
— 
— 
47 
9 
152 
102 
— 
— 
33 
106 
50 
137 
27 
76 
114 
106 
142 
11.61 
0.25 (0.29) 
0.36 
0.33 
0.48 
0.75 
0.73 
6.60 
19.84 
0.27 (0.26) 
0.05 
0.87 
0.58 
7.83 
10.52 
0.19 (0.17) 
0.61 
0.29 
0.78 
0.15 
0.43 
0.65 
0.61 
0.81 
— 
21 
13 
9 
27 
82 
78 
— 
— 
31 
9 
92 
68 
— 
— 
16 
71 
9 
80 
11 
48 
65 
54 
76 
9.71 
0.22 (0.44) 
0.14 
0.10 
0.29 
0.87 
0.83 
6.60 
18.53 
0.33 (0.44) 
0.10 
0.98 
0.72 
7.89 
9.44 
0.17 (0.28) 
0.76 
0.10 
0.85 
0.12 
0.51 
0.69 
0.57 
0.81 
— 
22 
50 
48 
57 
50 
50 
— 
— 
16 
0 
60 
34 
— 
— 
17 
35 
41 
57 
16 
28 
49 
52 
66 
12.44 
0.27 (0.17) 
0.61 
0.59 
0.70 
0.62 
0.62 
6.59 
22.02 
0.20 (0.13) 
0 
0.74 
0.42 
7.77 
11.33 
0.21(0.08) 
0.43 
0.51 
0.70 
0.20 
0.35 
0.61 
0.64 
0.82 
Table 5.5 (continued) 
Pay system 
Step 
Merit 
Combination of step and merit 
COLA step 
Rate set in contract, not necessarily step 
Regular bonuses granted 
Profit or gain-sharing 
Training 
Job training/in-service training paid by 
employer 
Continuing education 
Tuition paid 
Tuition for children/spouse 
Employee involvement 
Labor/management committee 
Equal number of union and management 
No discussion of contractual issues 
Service/product quality committee 
Drug insurance 
Workers compensation provision 
All contracts 
Number 
106 
3 
5 
3 
48 
15 
5 
40 
30 
45 
5 
49 
27 
9 
5 
22 
55 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.61 
0.02 
0.03 
0.02 
0.27 
0.09 
0.03 
0.23 
0.17 
0.26 
0.03 
0.28 
0.15 
0.05 
0.03 
0.13 
0.31 
Private sector 
Number 
57 
1 
4 
0 
30 
11 
5 
19 
9 
15 
0 
25 
13 
8 
4 
8 
24 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.61 
0.01 
0.04 
— 
0.32 
0.12 
0.05 
0.20 
0.10 
0.16 
— 
0.27 
0.14 
0.09 
0.04 
0.09 
0.26 
Public sector 
Number 
48 
2 
1 
3 
18 
4 
0 
21 
21 
30 
5 
24 
14 
1 
1 
14 
31 
Mean or 
proportion 
0.61 
0.03 
0.01 
0.04 
0.22 
0.05 
— 
0.26 
0.26 
0.37 
0.06 
0.30 
0.17 (0.58) 
0.01 (0.04) 
0.01 
0.17 
0.38 
aNumbers in parentheses represent proportion of units with at least 25% part-time workers. 
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HOW COMPREHENSIVE ARE FIRST CONTRACTS? 
In order to assess just how comprehensive these first contracts are, 
we also examined whether and how these individual provisions cluster 
together. While there are a number of methods that could be used to 
evaluate the comprehensiveness of initial union agreements, we evalu-
ated the contracts in our sample based on whether they contained what 
we would consider a core set of provisions. This core includes anti-
discrimination clauses, grievance and arbitration, steward rights in in-
vestigating and processing grievances, union access, and seniority for 
layoff.4 While many contracts include important individual contract 
clauses, only 14 percent of the contracts in our sample contain all five of 
these core provisions. These data suggest that, while unions have made 
important strides in first contracts, considerably more work is necessary 
to achieve strong basic agreements. 
We need to recognize that good contracts, like organizing victories, 
don’t just happen. Given the increasing level of employer opposition to 
unions, extending all the way through the first-contract process, win-
ning first contract requires much more than simply good bargaining 
skills. As previous research has shown, unions can win first contracts 
only when they utilize a comprehensive, multifaceted, union-building 
strategy throughout both the organizing and the first-contract campaign 
(Bronfenbrenner 1996; Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2004). 
In the final analysis, the quality of the first contract that a union 
achieves is a direct product of their power—the power to stop or slow 
production, to interfere with companies’ profit centers, growth strate-
gies, or key relationships, or to bring influence to bear on the key deci-
sion makers of a larger employer. In the context of growing employer 
opposition, it is not enough to infer this power at the bargaining tables. 
Instead, unions that have successfully achieved stronger first agree-
ments have continued to use the same kind of comprehensive grassroots 
tactics inside and outside the workplace and in the broader community 
that helped them first achieve a union victory in the certification elec-
tion or card check recognition process and then throughout the first-
contract bargaining campaign that follows. These direct expressions of 
members support and activism—whether it be wearing union buttons or 
t-shirts, or holding solidarity days, community events, or mini-job ac-
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tions—combined with more indirect but still member-intensive lever-
age strategies involving customers, suppliers, regulators, or investors, 
are clear reminders to management of union power and are fundamental 
in achieving positive results. 
Indeed, a cursory analysis of the data here suggest that, in those 
units where the union runs a moderately aggressive organizing cam-
paign, the likelihood that any of the five core elements will be included 
in a first contract rises between 5 and 20 percentage points. More ag-
gressive and strategic organizing and first-contract campaigns not only 
increase the probability of winning the organizing campaign and set-
tling the first contract, but also improves the quality and strength of the 
first contracts themselves. 
Clearly, more energy and attention need to be devoted to develop-
ing and implementing more comprehensive and strategic first-contract 
campaigns. In addition to running more aggressive first-contract cam-
paigns, unions need to work together to share hallmark first-contract 
language and to explore creative contract language. One of the dis-
couraging findings of this research is that few contracts contained lan-
guage addressing job loss, staffing, mandatory overtime, technological 
change, privatization, and plant closing—crucial issues facing workers 
today. While these are difficult issues to take on even in mature bargain-
ing relationships, unions need to begin addressing these issues in first 
agreements. 
It is also important to recognize that first-contract language is sim-
ply that—language—until and unless the union does what it takes to 
implement and enforce what it has negotiated in the agreement. Anti-
discrimination language is worthless if members of a local union are too 
intimidated to file and follow through on grievances, or the local leader-
ship fails to take discrimination violations seriously. Seniority and bid-
ding language are meaningless if the union turns a blind eye when less 
senior workers are moved into higher-paying jobs. 
While we have not gathered data on the operation and effectiveness 
of the local unions where these first contracts were negotiated, we sug-
gest that the shape and scope of the organizing and first-contract cam-
paign is a major predictor of a local’s ability to use and enforce a first 
contract to its fullest. Campaigns that develop and utilize representative 
rank-and-file leadership, and that start acting like a union long before 
the first contract is reached, are much more likely to already have in 
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place the leadership structure and membership involvement necessary 
to make the most of the first-contract language they negotiate. When 
both organizing and first-contract campaigns are weak, it not only leads 
to weaker first-contract language, but also to less capacity to utilize and 
enforce that language once the first contract is won. 
CONCLUSIONS 
As we have seen, first contracts constitute significant victories 
for workers and their unions. These contracts provide important basic 
rights that go far beyond employment-at-will and institute a grievance 
procedure that allows for the enforcement of these rights. They also 
contain important restrictions on management rights, substituting se-
niority and equitable systems for the assignment of work, promotions, 
and layoffs, for arbitrary employer control. In addition, they establish 
an institutional presence for the union and the rank-and-file leadership 
in the workplace. Finally, first contracts establish, codify, and expand 
health insurance, pensions, and substantial paid leave benefits. 
While some unions are more successful in some areas than oth-
ers, clearly these contracts provide the foundation for a fundamentally 
different employment relationship than that which existed prior to the 
union organizing campaign. We must remember that these agreements 
are only the first in what typically become stronger agreements over 
time. The establishment of a grievance system, just cause, union access, 
and stewards’ rights is an enormous accomplishment for workers and 
unions confronting employers who for decades clung to their absolute 
“right to manage” and who fought the union organizing effort with ev-
erything they could. Even if less than comprehensive, these agreements 
make significant inroads into management prerogatives and, in future 
negotiations, leave room to strengthen and expand these inroads into 
management control. 
Our findings also suggest that union first contracts could be more 
comprehensive. While this does not diminish the significant victories 
that the first contracts we studied represent, it reminds us of the promise 
and potential for strong first contracts and the strong unions that go with 
them. Workers risk so much to bring a union into their workplace; it is 
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imperative that the labor movement do everything in its power to ensure 
that the contracts they achieve, and the unions they build, make those 
risks worthwhile. 
Notes 
Funding for this project was provided by the AFL-CIO. The authors would like to thank 
Ian Campbell, Chad Apaliski, David Turner, and Robert Glase for research assistance. 
We would also like to acknowledge the editorial assistance of Beth Berry. 
1. The 55 contracts in the first private sector study were based on the 119 elections 
won in a random sample of 261 organizing campaigns that took place between 
July 1986 and June 1987. Copies of the first contracts were collected from 55 
(69 percent) of the 80 negotiators who returned surveys in units where the first 
contract was reached (Bronfenbrenner 1996). The 39 contracts collected in the 
second private sector study were based on 155 elections and 18 voluntary recog-
nitions won from a random sample of 525 NLRB organizing campaigns that took 
place from 1993 to 1995 (Bronfenbrenner 1997b). First contracts were collected 
for 39 (59 percent) of the 69 returned surveys from campaigns where a first 
contract was won. The 81 contracts collected in the third study were based on 
the 149 elections won from a random sample of 250 state and local certification 
elections in 1991 and 1992. First contracts were collected in 81 (63 percent) of 
the 129 cases in our sample where the election or voluntary recognition was won 
(Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1998). 
2. Anyone interested in a copy of the instrument we developed to conduct the 
content analysis should contact the authors at juravich@lrrc.umass.edu or 
klb23@cornell.edu. 
3. We did not include wage gains in these data because we were unable to obtain 
reliable information on the pre-organizing campaign base wage rate, since so few 
unorganized workplaces had established wage scales and employers frequently 
grant illegal wages increases during the course of the union campaign (Bronfen-
brenner 2001). 
4. These five fundamentals are defined as follows: race and gender discrimination 
plus at least one of the following antidiscrimination clauses: union activity, age, 
sexual harassment, sexual orientation, family status, handicap, or national ori-
gin; just cause; steward release time to investigate and process grievances (paid 
or unpaid); at least some union access (liberal or restricted); and seniority for 
layoffs. 
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